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In many countries, local borrowing is an important source for long-term development projects 
such as roads, bridges, and waterworks. Local borrowing for such projects is justified on the 
ground that benefit of these projects often last decades and the cost of these projects should 
be borne by future tax payers. However, there are serious concerns with issuance of local 
bonds by decentralized local governments. Local governments in Japan would not default on 
their borrowing because of such “implicit government guarantee.” As a result, lenders and tax 
payers have lost incentive to monitor subnational government because they view their 
investment as protected by a central government. The purpose of this paper is to review the 
local borrowing in Japan. At first, the transition from administrative control to rule-based, 
market oriented system is described. Following this, soft budget constraint and effectiveness 
of market discipline is investigated. Third, bank lending and local bonds as a way of 
financing long-term infrastructures are compared. Finally, we shed light on the credibility of 
local bonds in Japan and offer some proposals. 
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In many countries, local borrowing is an important source for long-term development projects 
such as roads, bridges, and waterworks. Local borrowing for such projects is justified on the 
ground that benefit of these projects often last decades and the cost of these projects should 
be borne by future tax payers. However, there are serious concerns with issuance of local 
bonds by decentralized local governments. When transfers are based on ex post financial 
needs rather than ex ante characteristics, the central government can bail out regions 
experiencing financial difficulties. Knowing that, local governments may be inclined to 
overspend, under-tax, and borrow excessively, since they can expect the central government 
to eventually guarantee repayment of local debts (Rodden and Eskeland 2003). Moreover, 
lenders also lose incentive to monitor subnational government because they view their 
investment as protected by a central government. This kind of soft budget constraint problem 
would not exist if the central government could commit to a non-bailout policy, but it is 
difficult for the center to do so in the short run. 
 
Faced with these challenges, countries have adopted various institutional approaches to 
contain subnational borrowing. According to Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997), these 
approaches have been grouped into four broad categories. Some countries rely on capital 
markets to contain subnational borrowing. In several countries, the central government is 
empowered with administrative control over subnational borrowing. The central government 
can also try to contain subnational borrowing by imposing a fiscal rule. Under the cooperative 
approaches, a negotiation process between the central and the subnational government 
designs subnational borrowing controls. 
 
Given these background, Japan is now under the transition period where implicit government 
guarantee as well as administrative control are being phase out in favor of fiscal rules and 
market discipline. So far, permission from the central government is required, repayment cost 
of local bonds are fixed by Local Public Finance Plan. In addition, the system of financial 
rehabilitation is used to put fiscally distressed local government under the direct control of the 
central governments. Local governments, therefore, would not default on their borrowing 
because of such “implicit government guarantee.” As a result, lenders and tax payers have 
lost incentive to monitor subnational government because they view their investment as 
protected by a central government. The general government debt outstanding amounted to 
about JPY 760 trillion and debt/GDP ratio exceeded 150 per cent in FY2005. About JPY 170 
trillion was local government debts. The Japan’s local bond is now paid to attention not only 
in the domestic policy debates but also in foreign countries, as the bankrupt of Yubari City 
decorated top one side of the New York Times (The New York Times 2007). 
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The purpose of this paper is to review the local borrowing in Japan. At first, the transition 
from administrative control to rule-based, market oriented system is described. Following this, 
soft budget constraint and effectiveness of market discipline is investigated. Third, bank 
lending and local bonds as a way of financing long-term infrastructures are compared. Finally, 
we shed light on the credibility of local bonds in Japan and offer some proposals. 
 




We shall begin by brief over view of recent change in the local bond system. The Japan’s 
local bond system has been severely controlled by the central government. Adopting the 
no-loan policy as a rule, the case that local bond can be exceptionally issued is enumerated in 
the law. The cases stipulated in the article 5 of local public finance law include: 1) 
expenditure for public enterprises like traffic, gas, and water service, 2) investment, loan, 3) 
refinance of local bonds, 4) disaster restoration works expenditure, disaster relief expense, 
and 5) public works. Local governments have had to obtain permission from the central 
government, when they want to issue local bonds. For local bonds that have received such 
permission, the entire amount of future expenses for repayment cost was appropriated in 
Local Finance Plans where revenue sources are secured by the Local Allocation Tax. 
Investors and financial institutions can lend to financially weak local governments without 
monitoring credit risk.   
 
The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) monitored the financial position 
of the local government directly, and have not permitted bond issuance if debt-service ratio 
would exceed a certain limit. In addition, when fiscal deficit becomes more than a certain 
limit, the local government must offers applying for the Local Fiscal Reconstruction 
Promotion Special Law, and is put under the direct control of the central government (The 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2006a). Thus, it can be said that local 
governments would not default on their loans under the current local finance system. 
 
The main creditors of local governments were the central government and public enterprise. 
Looking at the creditors a decade ago (FY1988), the private capital amounted to only 40 
percent of the total. On the contrary, public fund –Fiscal Investment and Loan Program and 
the Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal Enterprise- reached to almost 60 percent. Local 
borrowing depended heavily on the public fund. In addition, three-quarter of private fund was 
derived from private placement bond procured from the related local financial institution. The 
share of publicly advertised bond for many and unspecified investors was only 9 percent or 
less. To put it in another way, neither the taxpayer nor the investor were able to monitor the                                            
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fiscal management of the local authority. It was not surprising to see that cost of local bond 
was almost uniform across the countries, irrespective of liquidity and the creditworthiness. As 
for all of public advertisement groups, issuance conditions were uniform.   
 
There is, however, serious concerns with implicit government guarantee. Neither the taxpayer 
nor the institutional investor takes into account credit risk of bonds issued by local authority 
with financial difficulties. Local residents have no incentive to defeat the mayor and the 
assembly member by the election. The more a mechanism that does not allow local 
government to go bankrupt is enhanced, the less credit market and taxpayer exert a 
disciplining role. In the following, we outline the recent reform packages and assess them.   
 
Prior consultation system 
 
Traditional approval system has been replaced by prior consultation system in FY 2006, since 
Diet approved the Omnibus Law of Decentralization in FY1999. Under the new scheme, the 
local government can issue bonds even if mutual agreement with MIC is not obtained1. On 
the other hand, the permission system will be still applied to local governments whose debt 
service ratio exceeds 18 per cent, so that the creditworthiness of the entire local bond would 
not be changed. The level of 18 percent was decided so that the risk weight attached to the 
local bonds to be zero. It turned out that 12 prefectures and the designated major cities and 
400 municipalities will become local bodies under the permission system at the first year 
(The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2006c). Taking deteriorating fiscal 
conditions since FY 1999 into accounts, this result is not surprising. Many experts expect 




The main creditors of local authorities have also been changed from public funds to private 
funds derived from capital market. Since the reform of the Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Program of 2000, public fund as of creditors to local government has been slashed. Until the 
m, postal savings and pension funds had to be deposited in the Trust Fund Bureau of Ministry 
of Finance by law. Since these deposits were loosely credited to local governments, it has 
been halted in April, 2001 as a part of deregulation in financial sector. Instead, the central 
government has to issue whole national bonds (investment-and-loan bonds) in the capital 
market, and can only sublease these funds to local governments. As a result of this reform, 
                                                  
1  The degree of implicit government guarantee for disagreement bond will change. It might 
be limited to non-receiving local authorities of the Local Allocation Tax that launch to issue 
of the disagreement bond.                                              
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local governments need to finance more money from the capital market on their own2.   
[Insert figure 1 near here] 
The public sector funds now consists of three components;1) “fiscal loan funds” in which the 
central government issues national bonds and subleases them to local governments; 2) direct 
financing of postal savings and the postal life insurance reserve fund; and 3) funds of the 
Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal Enterprises. The public sector funds will decrease 
further, because the direct financing of postal savings and the postal life insurance reserve 
fund will be abolished in fiscal year 2007. In addition, it has been decided that the Japan 
Finance Corporation for Municipal Enterprises will also terminated in FY 2008. These 
changes can be demonstrated by the fund raising structure of local bond (see figure 1). The 
public funds decreased absolutely, and its relative ratio reduced to only 40 percent or less in 
FY 2007. Fall in public fund has been compensated by increase in private capital, with 
growing volume of publicly advertised bond.   
 
                                                  
2  Direct financing to local government from postal savings and the postal life insurance 
reserve fund is still permitted.                                            
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Box 7.1 Bank lending or bond market? 
There are two models of municipal credit markets: bank lending, which financed municipal 
investment in Western Europe throughout most the 20
th Century; and municipal bonds, which have 
been the foundation of municipal borrowing in North America. The municipal bank philosophy can 
be summarized in three principles:   
•  Municipal bank strives to establish permanent partnership relations with its local clients. One 
argument for establishing municipal banks is that only they can afford to support municipalities in 
the early stages of their learning about the credit market.   
•  Municipality bank performs monitoring function in stead of individual investor. Monitoring is 
facilitated by the partner relationship that gives the municipal bank special knowledge of the 
municipality’s budgets and finance.   
•  The bundled services that municipal banks offer rarely are priced to correspond with 
incremental costs for particular services. As a result, credit assessments are used rarely to 
establish the risk premium that ought to be charged to a particular borrower.   
Municipal banks, however, have been severely challenged by financial sector deregulation. Most 
have also lost their preferential access to sources of long-term savings, forcing them to compete with 
other financial institutions for savings. The problem of bank lending within the framework of 
standard commercial banking is exposing municipalities to short-term savings horizons. On the other 
hand, local capital financing through bond issuance offers a different approach to the three principles 
underlying municipal bank lending. 
•  The essence of a bond issue is that it is freshly competed for on each occasion. Neither 
institutional nor individual purchasers of bonds need have a long-term relationship with the issuer. 
In a municipal bond market, information on local financial conditions is provided by issuers to the 
market. Bond markets rely on public disclosure of municipal financial information. Credit-rating 
firms have developed a presence in every municipal bond market of significant size.   
•  Municipal bond market unbundled the various support functions that a municipality can receive 
from a municipal bank. Local governments can make separate decisions about where to maintain 
their liquid deposits and where to obtain financial advisory services. Because urban infrastructure 
in mature bond markets is financed through bond issues of 20-30 year maturities or even longer, 
bond issues are assumed to open access to longer-term sources of funds than bank loans. 
                                            Source: Kim (2003); Peterson, G. (2003) 
   
 
There is no need to choose a single instrument as the “right” way to handle local government 
credit. Many countries simultaneously use bank lending to municipalities and local bond 
issuance. The policy rationale, however, justifies emphasizing development of local bond                                            
 
7
markets (see box 1). The public monitoring and public disclosure required for efficient bond 
market operation are consistent with greater transparency for all public financial transactions. 
Financial sector deregulation has eliminated the possibility of having quasi-monopoly 
municipal banks draw on especially protected government allocations of low-cost, long-term 
savings to finance local infrastructure. In a competitive world, bonds have more ways to tap 
institutional and household long-term savings. Even when the ultimate credit extended to a 
local government continues to be a loan from a bank or other financial institution, the 
financial intermediary will increasingly raise its own capital for on lending from bond issues. 
That is the direction of change for the most successful intermediation vehicles. Even Credit 
Local de France, the original municipal bank, now raises the bulk of its financing on the bond 
market. When it concerns the big city and administrative divisions in our country, the local 
authority should separately found the mechanism of a joint issue about a small-scale 
municipality expanding the funding from the private organization by the issue of publicly 




The way of bond floatation has been changed too. 42 out of 1800 municipalities now issue 
publicly advertised local bond in the capital market in FY 2006(Investigating Committee on 
Local Bond 2007). In the past four decade, Japan employed so-called “uniform negotiation 
system”, where only MIC was responsible for the negotiation with creditors so that cost of 
individual local bond would be uniform across the regions. 
 
Reflecting the widening gap in the secondary market prices, the central government has 
allowed the Tokyo metropolitan government to issue bonds under different conditions than 
those applying to publicly advertised bonds issued by other local governments since April 
2002. This new approach― called the two-table-approach ―could have served to enhance 
market principle. In addition, four local bodies (Tokyo, Kanagawa Prefecture, Yokohama City, 
and Nagoya City) adopted “one-to-one negotiation” method in FY2006. Under this scheme, 
each local body negotiates with creditors voluntarily and sales bonds through their own 
marketing. However, remaining local bodies still adopted uniform negotiation method, since 
creditworthiness of local bonds was uniform thanks to implicit government guarantee.   
 
However, the Fair Trade Commission argued that the uniform negotiation was inconsistent 
with a competition policy and does violate Antimonopoly Law in August, 2006. According to 
this statement, the MIC urged local governments to adopt one-to-one negotiation approach on 
August 14, 2006. In September 2006, a lot of local bodies could not find creditors; 
consequently issuance conditions came to reflect the price gap at the secondary markets. So 
far, there was no process in which both creditor and issuer search optimum conditions in the 
Japan’s local bond market. The intention of the MIC was strongly reflected in the uniform                                            
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issuance condition (Standard & Poor’s 2006b:2). The shift from uniform negotiation to 
one-to-one negotiation would have served to enhance market discipline. 
 
Early warning system 
 
It turned out that the financial condition of small local governments had deteriorated. Yubari 
City, Hokkaido falling into default declared to submit application to local body under the 
fiscal rehabilitation plan on June 20, 2006. The MIC agreed on the fiscal consolidation plan 
of Yubari City on March 6, 2007. The city was designated by the Ministry as the local 
government under the fiscal rehabilitation scheme. This means its budget will be directly 
controlled by the ministry, effectively stripping the city of its autonomy. Under the 
consolidation plan, 18 years financial reconstruction plan will last through FY2024: slashing 
the number of municipal officials; raising utility fees; and shutting down public facilities to 
pay off its JPY 35.3 billion debt. The source of defaults is lack of the fiscal discipline, an 
excessive investment, and myopic fiscal management that covers deficit by floating debts3. 
Until June 2006, Yubari had hidden its snowballing debt by window dressing its account, 
making it difficult for the MIC to learn the truth. As a result, it had accumulated JPY 63 
billion of debts (14 times annual tax revenues)4.   
 
To prevent a recurrence of “Yubari shock” became to be paramount importance. Several 
problems became evident with the current fiscal rehabilitation scheme. Local governments 
would be designated as fiscal rehabilitation authorities, if their deficit in the general account 
would exceed certain limit. However, the debt on the general account is recognized only 
when the maturity is more than one year, thereby floating debt is not considered. Moreover, 
the special accounts and public corporation’s debts are not taken into account, when the 
center designates financial rehabilitation authorities.   
 
Underlying goal of new system is to prevent local body from going bankrupt by establishing 
early warning system. Law Concerning Improvement of the Financial Condition of local 
authority 2007 was consequence of this goal. The new system contains three elements: 1) 
                                                  
3  Looking at the local governments applying fiscal rehabilitation plan after the 1970s, it 
concentrated on the old coal production region in Fukuoka Prefecture. A common source of 
difficulties was urgent need for the regional economic development in response to change 
in the national coal policy. Because the time of the close of a mine in Hokkaido was later 
than that of Fukuoka prefecture, financial deterioration of Hokkaido’s area has delayed. 
Although Yubari City is an extreme case, 2
nd and 3
rd Yubari City would occur in near future 
(For detail, see Standard & Poor’s (2006a). 
4  It also turned out that Yubari city had borrowed long term money illegally from the 
Hokkaido Development Fund without governor’s permission.                                              
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monitoring financial position of local government by new comprehensive index; 2) central 
and prefecture government’s involvement in rehabilitation planning; and 3) temporary 
financing of deficit covering local bond (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication 
2006d). As Morgan Stanley report points out, “the transparency and the early warning were 
introduced. There is also a deterrent effect of moral hazard, which is more effective than 
market discipline. It is significant for containing tax payer’s burden” (Morgan Stanley 
2007:5).On the other hand, the discussion on the debt adjustment continues among MIC 
informal study group. Nevertheless, debt adjustment would not apply to the existing debts 
and the probability of default would be minimized by the new Law. 
 
In sum, the change in last few years was epoch-making in the history of Japan’s local finance 
since U.S. occupation after the World War蝕. The driving forces for these reforms include 
three factors: decentralization, deregulation in financial sector and the deterioration of the 
financial conditions of the small local governments. The reform is a step in right direction. It 
will take more time for the local government and the institutional investor to become 
accustomed to new system as a player. One of the concerns is that small-scale municipalities 
with scarce fiscal resources would become disadvantageous as decentralization progresses. 
 
FISCAL CRISIS AND LOCAL DEBT 
 
Soft Budget Constraints 
 
The next issue to be dealt with is to examine the impact of existing local bond system on the 
fiscal behavior of the local government. Before investigating Japan’s case, we shall take a 
brief look at the theory of soft budget constraint (For detail, see Vigneault 2006). The 
possibility of a bailout does not stem from the existence of a common pool per se, but from 
the way it functions. When the transfers are based on ex post financial needs rather than ex 
ante characteristics, the central government can bail out the local government on the verge of 
bankruptcy. In this case budgets constraint faced by the sub-national government becomes 
soft (Kornai, Maskin and Roland 2003). If sub-national government under collect taxes, 
overspend, or default on the debt, they expect the federal government to cover the gap 
between actual and affordable expenditure. Moreover, lenders also lose incentive to police 
sub-national governments because they view their investments as protected by a federal 
government guarantee. This problem would not exist if central governments could commit 
credibly to never revising transfer allocations ex post, that is, to non-bailout policy. Although 
such a policy stance may be optimal in the long run, it is difficult to commit in the short run, 
especially if it involves painful local default or a reduction in the provision of basic public 
services. In addition, a default by one region can increase the cost of borrowing for all other 
regions in a federation, so neighbor regions may be interested in providing the defaulting                                            
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region with a bailout transfer. 
 
Recent survey revealed that the federal governments have provided bailout transfer to 
defaulting sub-national government in 22 out of 52 countries in the past 20 years (Singh and 
Plekhanov 2005:11). In Sweden, 1,697 bailouts were granted to municipalities during the 
1970s and 1990s (Vigneault 2006:152). Fiscal equalization combined with borrowing 
autonomy in Sweden is likely to have contributed to fiscal indiscipline during this period. The 
reduction of regional fiscal autonomy in Italy was so severe that by the end of the 1970s 
regional governments were dependent on transfer for almost 97 percent of their financing. A 
continuous system of bailout was thus created. The reforms introduced in the 1990s went 
some way toward hardening local government budget constraints, but the soft budget 
constraints problem has not been eliminated in Italy (Vigneault 2006:150). 
 
Second, when sub-national governments are heavily dependent on transfers and tax sharing, 
the central government can not commit to ignore future bailout requests, even if sub-national 
governments have full autonomy over how much borrow each year. Germany’s system of 
fiscal federalism provides a striking example. Creditors believe that the “equivalent living 
conditions” clause and the equalization system imply a rather straightforward federal 
guarantee of sub-national debt. Bailout expectation among the recipient states was quite 
natural. The expectations were confirmed explicitly in 1992 when the Federal Constitutional 
Court handed down its decision stipulating that the Constitution required the federal 
government to providing bailout transfer to Bremen and Saarland (Rodden 2003a:172-178).   
 
Third, hierarchical or market-based oversight on sub-national borrowing can fail. The 
disastrous bailout episode of the late 1980s and 1990s among the Brazilian states provides 
striking example. The Brazilian constitution and intergovernmental relations provided voters 
with neither information nor incentive to monitor state governments. Creditor believed that 
state debt was guaranteed by the federal government. Thus, when faced with an unexpected 
external shock such as drop in inflation rate, high interest rate, state governments faced no 
incentive to adjust; rather the logical course of action was to demand a bailout. The center’s 
vulnerability is that some states like San Paulo are too big to fail. The most important reason 
for the center's vulnerability, however, was the fact that the center itself is often little more 
than a loose coalition of state-based interest groups (Rodden 2003b:229-237).   
 
Causes of Expanding Fiscal Deficits 
 
Turning our attention to Japan’s local finance, the share of local debts in gross domestic 
product is about 37 per cent in FY2005, which stand out in Japan’s history of public finance. 
In fact, the share in GDP was only 5 per cent during the high economic growth period of 
1950-60 and roughly 15-20 per cent after the oil crisis of 1970. Therefore, increase in local                                            
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debts after the burst of bubble economy has been marked (Mochida 2004:243-244). In 
addition, the Japanese local debt is remarkably high, by international comparison. The 
Japanese local debt problem is very severe compared with other countries, since the 
debt/GDP ratio in Britain is only 5.5 per cent, 11.3 per cent in Sweden and 20.8 per cent in 
the United States as Figure 7.2 shows. Local debts in Japan are now worst not only in Japan’s 
history but also in international perspective. 
[Insert figure 2 near here] 
Why has the local debts soared in recent years? The answer to this can be derived from Table 
7.1. This table shows the changes in net lending of local government as a percentage of GDP 
and they are divided into the improvement period (1989-1995) and deterioration period 
(1995-2001). This table suggests the following points. The source of deterioration in net 
borrowing was almost all in expenditure increases, and the contribution of revenue decrease 
was negligible. Expenditure increase was largest in government investment driven by public 
works, while government consumption and social transfer payment increased slightly5. On 
the other hand, the source of improvement was almost evenly divided between cuts in 
spending and revenue increase. Expenditure cuts were largest in government investment, 
while final consumption and social transfer increased slightly. The source of increased 
revenues was concentrated on the indirect tax, grants and local allocation tax, while direct 
taxes decreased. In sum, the local debt has soared rapidly because local government spending 
on public works has increased as macroeconomic stabilization during recession periods.   
[Insert table 1 near here] 
The revenue side is not a main cause of the debts accumulation. Certainly, natural decrease 
and cuts in both inhabitant tax and enterprise tax has led to stagnation in total tax revenues. 
The forecast of economic growth rate was also so optimistic that there was unexpected 
natural decrease in tax revenues (Mochida 2004:245-246). But it is only of minor importance. 
Instead, the Japanese government implemented economic stimulus package several times 
during 1992-95 and 1998-2000. It is estimated that the total of the economic measure reaches 
JPY 136 trillion. Among these, the economic measure with an immediate effective demand 
was a JPY 17 trillion of tax reduction and JPY 66 trillion of the public works. Anyway, it is 
evident that the government has been consistently employing a Keynesian type fiscal policy 
through the 1990’s in order to stimulate shrinking Japanese economy.   
 
Local government spending on public works remains very high by OECD standards (OECD 
2005c), reflecting generous support from the central government. Capital formation 
corresponds to 8 percent of GDP in Japan, of which 80 percent is delivered by the local 
governments. It is difficult for the center to engage counter-cyclical fiscal policy without 
                                                  
5  Though it seemingly looks unnatural that the total annual revenue didn’t decrease during 
the recession period, this is so because an increase in the grants and local allocation tax had 
cancelled out decrease in indirect taxes and direct taxes.                                            
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cooperation of the local governments. The center also has policy instruments for inducing and 
controlling whole local governments to cooperate with macroeconomic policy: Local Tax 
Law; Local Finance Plan; and Local Bond Plan. On the other hand, the central government 
intended to make local governments expand public works, since it was urgent need to cut 
central expenditure by the slashing its own public works and intergovernmental transfer. 
Local governments were eventually forced to expand the public works project by issuing 
bond, of which principal and interest will be paid by the central government through Local 
Allocation Tax.   
 
Incentive to debt finance   
 
In the fiscal federalism literature, political economy model of grants has examined 
intergovernmental transfer that may be directly provided to residents (For detail, see Sato 
2006). Individual legislators demand project that benefit a particular are or an identifiable 
group of constituents; the costs of these projects are funded by the center. These projects may 
be executed by the local government that receives the transfers or directory by the center. 
Cost sharing creates a fiscal wedge between social marginal costs and locally borne marginal 
costs. The result is that projects are over expanded, because individual legislators undervalue 
their prices and impose a large fiscal burden on the nation as a whole. The tragedy of the 
commons (also known as the common pool problem) occurs, as public expenditures become 
excessive and regions impose fiscal burdens on one another.   
 
In Japan, common pool problems took the form of generous support to debt repayment cost 
by the intergovernmental transfer: the principal and interest repayment of the local bonds was 
included into to the standard fiscal needs of the local allocation tax. As grant entitlement are 
adjusted upward to finance most of the redemption costs of local bonds issued to finance 
public works, the LAT creates incentive to rely on debt financing instead of adjusting local 
taxes or spending levels. This also reflects the use of the LAT system to support national 
fiscal policy in recent years. In FY 2004, interest and redemption cost of local bonds 
accounted for 12 percent of local governments’ standard fiscal needs (Cabinet Office 2001). 
Despite a rapid increase in local debt, the existing fiscal rule on debt servicing costs has not 
become biding since it deducts bond repayment costs, which are financed through the LAT, 
from the total amount of local government servicing costs (OECD 2005c:130). According to 
the type of bond or the fiscal capacity of local government, from 30 to 100 percent of the 
repayment costs are to be financed through higher grant entitlement. In the scheme of 
“comprehensive development bond”, for example, 75 per cent of public works are financed 
by local bond, of which 55 per cent of repayment cost is included into the LAT entitlement. It 
means that 41.25 per cent (0.75×0.55) of the project cost would be financed by non-residents. 
Mochida (2004) estimated that the central government finances more than one-third of local 
government outstanding bond as revealed by table 7-2. Higo and Nakagawa (2001) have                                            
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produced similar estimation for FY1999. Council on Economy and Fiscal Policy argued that 
“inclusion of bond repayment costs into the basic financial need of LAT should be reviewed 
according to the nature of the project” (Council on Economy and Fiscal Policy 2003).     
[Insert table 2 near here] 
Three points are worth to mention. First, distinction should be made between individual and 
whole revenue guarantee of bond repayment costs. The former means that the center commits 
to guarantee repayment cost of individual local bond. It is not appropriate, since it gives rise 
to a fiscal wedge between social marginal costs and locally borne marginal costs. On the 
other hand, “whole revenue guarantee” is to sum up the repayment cost of the total local 
bonds and appropriate them into the Local Public Finance Plan. It makes sense, since fiscally 
weak local governments can borrow money to implement its mandated functions. “Whole 
revenue guarantee” thus works as a comprehensive credit enhancement but does not 
substitute for credit; thereby creditors to local governments buy local bonds without fear 
about bankruptcy6. 
 
Second, the extent of discretion on bond floatation varies depending on the type of debt. 
There are implicitly two types of local bonds: independent bonds and obligated bonds. As for 
the former where the local governments issued bond independently, it is not appropriate to 
cover repayment cost by LAT, even if “whole revenue guarantee” is necessary as credit 
enhancement. On the other hand, the center sometimes compelled the local government to 
issue obligated bonds for several reasons: to cover revenue shortfall in Local Finance Plan; to 
substitute for borrowing in the LAT special account, and to make up for revenue loss due to 
tax cut policy etc. Since local governments have no discretion on the issuance of such bonds, 
the center should have responsibility for providing “individual revenue guarantee” for 
repayment cost as a matter of course. Third, it is necessary to separate the newly issued bond 
from existing bonds. Generous support by LAT for the newly issued independent bonds 
should be terminated. However, the center should commit to provide the LAT to finance 
repayment cost of existing bonds, since change in the commitment would have adverse 




As at the central government level, there is an urgent need to restore fiscal sustainability at 
the local level, and to contain local debt in particular. The central government has removed 
the approval system in FY 2006. While this may have positive impact on local government 
                                                  
6  The risk weight of local bond in the B I S criterion was set to zero as sovereign bond was. 
Even after Basel蝕, it will be set to zero as sovereign bond in a standard technique of credit 
risk based on of BIS criterion.                                              
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fiscal discipline by weakening the implicit guarantee on their local bonds, it will deprive the 
central government of a direct control instrument over local debt. This calls for a 
strengthening other instrument- fiscal rules and market instrument- to discipline local 
government fiscal behavior (OECD 2005c:139). A number of countries have relied on 
approaches to the control of sub-national government borrowing that are based on standing 
rules (Ter-Minassian and Craig 1997; Singh and Plekhanov 2005). Some of these rules set 
limits on the absolute level of indebtedness of sub-national jurisdictions (Austria, Spain); 
others limit sub-national borrowing to investment purposes (Germany); yet others limit on 
sub-national debts to the indicator of their debt service on the revenues(Spain, Japan, Brazil, 
Korea). Rule-based approaches have the advantage of transparency as well as avoiding short 
term political factors. On the other hand, by their nature, rule-based approaches lack 
flexibility and often end up the practices aimed at circumventing the rules. Such practices 
include: reclassification of expenditures from current to capital or off-budgets (china); use of 
sale and leaseback arrangements (Denmark, Hungary).   
 
Turning our attention to Japan, existing fiscal rule should be gradually hardened, and their 
coverage broadened. Central government dictate a number of rules to be respected if a local 
government envisages issuing local bonds. The main ones are: 
•  So-called “Net revenue” should not exceed 5 and 20 percent, respectively, for prefecture 
and municipalities of general-purpose resources (i.e., mainly ordinary taxes, LAT and the 
Local Transfer Tax). The net revenue is defined by subtracting expenditure from the sum of 
local taxes, LAT, earmarked grants, fees and charges, and local bond issues. 
•  The average ratio of debt repayment costs (only principal and excluding those financed 
through the Local Allocation Tax) to general-purpose resources over the past three fiscal 
years should be below 20 per cent. 
•  Its ratio of tax collection to estimated tax revenues in the year should not fall to less than 
90 per cent. In addition, a local government setting tax rate below standard rates set by the 
central government is not allowed to issue bonds to finance public works.   
 
If local governments do not comply with these rules, they can not, under certain conditions, 
continue to issue bonds. For example, if a local government’s average ratio of debt repayment 
cost is between 20 and 30 percent, local bonds for general works projects without central 
government subsidies and bonds for recreation, sports, and social welfare facilities are not 
permitted. Where the ratio is 30 percent or over, bonds are not approved except for natural 
disaster restoration, local public enterprise expense, and other specific expenditures. Also, 
municipalities running a “net revenue” exceeding 20 percent of its general-purpose resources 
can issue bonds if it has introduced “financial rehabilitation plan” approved by the MIC. 
Although short-term financing and a special local allocation tax are provided to local 
governments under financial rehabilitation plans, these governments are forced to reduce 
excessive personnel, cut salaries, raise their collection of usage and handling fees, and take                                            
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other measures under the jurisdiction of the central government. The recent example of a 
local government under a financial rehabilitation plan is Akaike Town in Fukuoka Prefecture. 
Akaike became a local government under a financial rehabilitation plan in 1991 and 
completed its rehabilitation plan in FY2000. Currently, Yubari city of Hokkaido is designated 
as local governments under financial rehabilitation plans. 
 
Despite a rapid increase in local debt, the existing fiscal rule has not yet become binding. The 
primary reason for this is that portions that are repaid through the local allocation tax are 
deducted from public bond expenditures that are included in the ratio of repayment cost. 
Since the latter half of the 1980s, between 30% and 100% of the cost of repaying principal 
and interest (determined based on the type of local bond and the fiscal capacity of the issuing 
local government) has been included in the basic financial needs of the local allocation tax. 
Another reason is that so far fiscal rules are based on flow-based indices, and thus they have 
little binding authority against debt outstanding. Mochida (2004) estimated correlation 
between the ratio of repayment cost and credit risk of local bonds with conclusion that there 
are no significant correlation between them. This means that current fiscal rule has not been 
effective for containing local debts. Third, the concept of “net revenue”, which is the basis for 
dropping local governments to “local government under financial rehabilitation plan” status, 
is too generous. Local governments can manipulate their net revenue flexibly by issuing more 
public bonds or liquidating funds. Thus, in order to measure net cash flow for individual 
fiscal years, local bonds and liquidated funds should be excluded from revenue when 
calculating net revenue.   
 
Recent reform initiatives could contribute to enhancing the role of fiscal rule. Several 
problems became evident with the current fiscal rehabilitation scheme. Local governments 
would be designated as fiscal rehabilitation authorities, if their deficit in the general account 
would exceed certain limit. However, the debt on the general account is recognized only 
when the maturity is more than one year, thereby floating debt is not considered. Moreover, 
the special accounts and public corporation’s debts are not taken into account, when the 
center designates financial rehabilitation authorities. Underlying goal of new system is to 
prevent local body from going bankrupt by establishing early warning system. Law 
Concerning Improvement of the Financial Condition of local authority 2007 was consequence 
of this goal. The new system contains three elements: 1) monitoring financial position of local 
government by new comprehensive index; 2) central and prefecture government’s 
involvement in rehabilitation planning; and 3) temporary financing of deficit covering local 
bond (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication 2006b). As Morgan Stanley report 
points out, “the transparency and the early warning were introduced. There is also a deterrent 
effect of moral hazard, which is more effective than market discipline. It is significant for 
containing tax payer’s burden” (Morgan Stanley 2007:5). 







The private sector has underwritten an increasing share of local government bonds and each 
local body is allowed to negotiate with creditors voluntarily and sales bonds through their 
own marketing since FY2006. However, market mechanisms have not been playing major 
role in enhancing local government fiscal discipline in Japan. Some other countries use 
market discipline as a regulation on sub-national borrowing. In this case, sub-national 
governments have no constitutional or legal limits on their borrowing, and are not subject to 
central government controls on it. Sometimes, they are subject to self imposed balanced 
budget rule in order to enhance credit rating. Major countries that use this approach are 
Canada, Switzerland, and USA. However, it has been suggested that a number of stringent 
conditions need to be satisfied for financial markets to exert effective discipline on 
sub-national government borrowing. 
 
There seems to be no universal agreement in the literature about the role of market discipline 
in disciplining local government fiscal behaviors. Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997) suggests 
that sole reliance for government borrowing is unlikely to be appropriate in many 
circumstances. They argue that market discipline has been not fully effective as it can be 
found in the experience of Canada and Brazil, instead rule based approaches to debt control 
would be appear preferable, in terms of transparency and certainty, to administrative control 
(Ter-Minassian and Craig 1997:169-171). On the other hand, Rodden and Eskeland (2003) 
argues that the U.S. States and Canadian provinces are the clearest example of success of 
market discipline, while it is rare. In addition they suggest that decentralized public sectors 
with relatively balanced budgets - the local and municipal sectors in Norway, Canada, and 
Hungary - apply strong hierarchical oversight on sub-national borrowing (Rodden and 
Eskeland 2003:433-438).   
 
Turning our attention to recent debate in Japan, some commentators and analysts argue that   
implicit government guarantee to local bond should be removed completely and let market 
mechanism play a major role in enhancing local government fiscal discipline. Such a 
market-oriented policy stance has been increasingly accentuated since “Yubari shock” of 
2006. Issuers having low bond ratings should have to pay high cost, and thus are forced by 
the market to enhance their creditworthiness. In the worst, local government goes bankrupt if 
it fails in improvement of the fiscal behavior. This is clearly shown by fiscal consolidation 
episode in Canada of the late 1990’s. Provincial budget constraints in Canada have been 
considered to be relatively soft. While there is no federal control at all over provincial 
borrowing, so long as there is no implied federal guarantee for provincial debts, monitoring                                            
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by the capital market seem to perform quite well. Even before the federal government began 
to gets its own fiscal house in order in the latter half of 1990s, many provincial governments 
had already begun to deal with the fiscal problems. As Bird points out “Democracy plus 
market works to overcome a number of institutional features that can be considered to be soft 
budget constraints” (Bird and Tassonyi 2003:111-115). 
 
It is necessary to satisfy some preconditions, however, so that “market discipline” may 
perform effectively, as the example of Canadian provinces shows. These preconditions are as 
follows: 1) adequate information on the borrower’s outstanding debt and repayment capacity 
should be available to potential lenders; 2) there should be no regulations on financial 
intermediaries than place government in a privileged borrower position; 3) there should be no 
perceived chance of bailout in the case of impending default; 4) the borrower should response 
to market signals before reaching the point of exclusion from new borrowing (Lane 1993; 
Ter-Minassian and Craig1997:157-162).   
 
Given these theoretical background and international experience, Japan’s local bond system 
satisfies is unlikely to satisfy most of these conditions at the moment. Instead of sole reliance 
on market discipline, Japan should learn a lot from the experience of France (see box 7.2): 
political and financial accountability for local borrowing by disclosing information on the 
borrower’s repayment capacity. The central government should ensure that adequate 
information on local government financial position is available and recognize differences in 
the creditworthiness of local bonds. For financial markets and fiscal rules to exert effective 
discipline on local government borrowing, adequate information on borrower’s outstanding 
and implicit liabilities, as well as on their repayment capacity, must be readily available. 
Table 7.3 shows that almost all prefecture and designated cities have disclosed relevant 
financial statements: balance sheet; income statement; balance sheet including public 
enterprise; and consolidated balance sheet. But ratio of municipalities with balance sheet is 
limited to 53 per cent, and less than 4 per cent of municipalities has consolidated balance 
sheet. The central government should request local governments to disclose information on 
their implicit liabilities, including those associated with retirement allowances for local public 
employees, as well as net assets of local public enterprises and so-called “third sector” 
companies. 
[Insert table 3 near here] 
Box 7.2    Local borrowing: episode in France 
In France, local governments’ budgets are basically balanced, while the central government budget is 
heavily unbalanced. Local government debt represents only two-thirds of the local governments’ 
yearly income and debt/GDP ratio is only 7 per cent. How does one explain the relative moderation of 
local governments in borrowing? Prud’homme (2006) points out following four points. 
•  It does not result from central government-imposed constraints. Local governments have no legal 
limits on their borrowing, and are not subject to central government controls on it since FY1983                                            
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when administrative control was completely abolished. During 1970s and early 80s, local 
governments could borrow only from state-owned institution. This constraint on free market was 
relaxed.  
•  Prud’homme points out that moderation does not result from the market discipline. This U.S.-type 
model does not function in France, at least at present. The international agencies do operate in 
France, and they have rated some regions and departments, as well as a few large cities. But the 
share of the bond market is too small for this model to function, at least for the time being.   
•  The constraints on borrowing are financial and political accountability. Banks know what ratios of 
interests to revenue are socially and politically sustainable, and they refuse to make loans that 
would lead to significantly higher ratios. Local governments themselves are prudent, because they 
fear that their political image would be affected by excessive indebtedness.   
•  In principle, the central government would not bail out a failing local government. When a 
relatively large commune (Angouleme) nearly went bankrupt in the 1980s, banks asked the central 
government to bail the commune out. However, the Ministry of Finance showed that there was no 
government guarantee for the local debt since the decentralization reform, and insisted the liability 
of the banks for irresponsible lending to the commune.   
Source: Prud’homme (2006) pp. 
106-110. 
 
Facilitating local access to credit 
 
As decentralization process goes on, the difference in repayment ability of local government 
will begin to widen. It is no longer appropriate to consider creditworthiness of local bonds 
uniform. It is likely to differentiate into two poles of large cities and fiscally weak small local 
governments. As the decentralization proceeds, for seasoned and sizable issuers such as 
prefectures and the major cities, market competition is likely to produce savings. However, 
this kind of competition leaves an unfilled niche for smaller and less experienced local 
governments with low creditworthiness.   
 
We shall describe briefly some episodes of evolution since late 1990s. During 1997 financial 
crises, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, main bank of the City of Sapporo, went bankrupt and also 
the rumor of the advanced redemption gave rise to spread in the secondary markets. In 
addition, “third sector” of Izumisano city in Osaka prefecture defaulted with huge 
indebtedness. Tokyo and Osaka prefecture also declared being “fiscal emergency” in 1998. 
Bond market evaluated that a part of local authority might default or declare postponement of 
repayment at that time. During 2001 to 2006, spread between sovereign bonds and publicly 
advertised local bonds had narrowed, reflecting quantitative easing monetary policy. 
Temporary widening of spread in early 2002 reflected the shock of Fiscal Investment and 
Loan Program reform and withdrawal of some banks from Hokkaido’s Syndicate members. 
Using December 2001 data, Mochida (2004) found that the main factor behind the price gap                                            
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was the difference in the degree of liquidity, but the influence of creditworthiness could not 
be totally denied. On the other hand, Norincyukin Research Institute (2002) notes that the 
interest rate spreads across local bonds widened markedly since the latter half of 2001 and 
that the influence of creditworthiness became clearer between 2000 and 2002. 
[Insert figure 3 near here] 
Since spring of 2006, however, with “Yubari shock” and argument for bankruptcy law by the 
study group within the MIC, spread started to widen again. Not only had the spread between 
sovereign and local bond and also difference among local bonds widened in the secondary 
market. According to empirical study (for this, see Oyama, Sugimoto and Tsukamoto 2006), 
local bonds market faced two different factors since spring 2006. First, the market 
participants recognized the possibility of local debt adjustment in near future and ending of 
quantitative easing monetary policy made the credit market more volatile. These common 
factors widened price gap betweens sovereign and local bonds. Secondly, a few local 
governments experienced financial distress since “Yubari shock” and the uniform negotiation 
approach for bond issuance had been replaced by one to one negotiation approach. These 
specific factors discriminated between local governments through different interest rate of 
bonds.  
 
There might be scarce demand of institutional investor to buy local bonds issued by such a 
small-scale municipalities. This niche can be partly filled by credit enhancement mechanism 
such as “bond bank”. Recently, the idea of bond bank and pooling a number of smaller issues 
was frequently referred by various groups7. Some private research institute also published a 
concrete plan concerning the local bond bank (National Institute for Research Advancement 
2006). After the termination of the Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal Enterprises in 
FY2008, the government should make a final decision about alternative organization. As 
Akiyama (2002) pointed out, investment trust doesn’t develop enough in Japan like U.S., 
option of local bond bank would be more realistic than a financial guarantee by commercial 
entity. 
 
Various U.S. states assist borrowing by small local governments through the establishment of 
municipal bond bank. Municipal bond banks are established as autonomous state agencies 
that issue tax-exempt securities to investors and apply the proceeds to purchase the collective 
bond issue of several local governments. By pooling a number of smaller issues and by using 
the superior credit rating of the state, municipal banks reduce the const of borrowing to 
smaller communities. An important lesson from industrial countries’ experience is that 
municipal finance cooperation operates well when they are run on commercial principles and 
                                                  
7  These groups include: advisory committee for decentralization within six national 
associations of chief executives; private consulting group of minister of MIC, named “21st 
century vision”.                                            
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compete for capital and borrowers. In such an environment, such agencies allow risk pooling, 
use economies of scale better, and bring to bear their knowledge of local governments and 
their financing potential to provide access to commercial credit on more favorable terms 
(Shah 2006:34-35). 
 




The default of Rumoi town of Hokkaido in 1925 was epoch-making in the history of local 
finance (Ishii 2001:128-129), since no municipalities went bankrupt in Post War period. 
Being faced with “Yubari shock of 2006”, however, some commentators and analysts argued 
for establishing bankruptcy law, so that “2
nd Yubari city” would not emerge8. Many of them 
have paid attention to Chapter 9 of federal Bankruptcy Law of the US as a reference (see box 
7-3). One of the reasons of such concern is that municipalities can not negotiate with creditors 
for adjustment its debts within the current framework of financial rehabilitation scheme (Doi 
2004). While argument for bankruptcy law is sensational, it is neither desirable nor feasible in 
Japan that distressed local government is allowed to reorganize (i.e., extending debt 
maturities, reducing the amount of principal and interest, refinancing the debt by obtaining a 
new loan) its debts in near future. The reasons for this are two folds: 
 
Box 7-3 Municipal bankruptcy legislation in US. 
The first municipal bankruptcy legislation was enacted in 1934 during the Great Depression. Congress 
enacted a revised Municipal Bankruptcy Act in 1937. In the more than 60 years, there have been fewer than 
500 municipal bankruptcy petitions filed. Although chapter 9 cases are rare, a filing by a large municipality 
can -like the 1994 filing by Orange County, California -involve many millions of dollars in municipal debts. 
The ingredients of the law are as follows   
•  There is no provision in the law for liquidation of the assets of the municipality and distribution of the 
proceeds to creditors. The purpose of chapter 9 is to provide a financially distressed municipality 
protection from its creditors while it develop and negotiate a plan for adjusting its debts.   
•  Only a “municipality” can file for relief under the chapter 9. There are three additional eligibility 
requirements for chapter 9: the municipality must be insolvent; be specifically authorized to be a debtor 
                                                  
8  Since July 2006, Minister of MIC’s private consulting group studied bankruptcy legislation. 
It submitted final report to the government (December 8, 2006) with conclusion that debt 
adjustment is one of the future options. On the other hand, the new decentralization 
promotion committee inaugurated in April, 2007 will come up with a new framework of 
bankruptcy law. Government official has confirmed that debts adjustment will not be 
applied to the existing debts.                                              
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by law; and has obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the claims. 
•  Chapter 9 is designed to recognize the court’s limited power over day-to-day operations of the debtors, 
while the debtors has broad powers to use it property, raise taxes and make expenditure as it sees fit. This 
ability is important to the survival of a municipality that has exhausted all other resources. 
•  The creditors’ role is also limited in chapter 9. Though creditors’ committee can select and authorize the 
employment of attorneys, creditors may not propose a plan of adjustment. 
Source: Administrative Office of United States Courts (2004) pp.45-52.   
 
First, we should pay attention to the impact of municipal bankruptcy on the bond market. The 
debt adjustment contributes to make creditors withdraw from inefficient public works. 
However, creditors might be reluctant to easing the eligibility requirement for filing by the 
local government. In the United States, it is not easy to obtain the agreement of many 
creditors with regard to debt adjustment plan. In fact, in the more than 60 years since US 
Congress established a federal mechanism for the resolution of municipal debts, there have 
been fewer than 500 municipal bankruptcy petitions filed, according to Administrative Office 
of United States Courts (2004). Among petitions filed, general purpose local governments 
were rare; many were concentrated on small special districts. 500 is a tiny number, given 
there almost 100,000 local governments in the US. As Wildasin says, “state or local fiscal 
crises are ‘curious incidents’ in US experience, exception to the general rule” (Wildasin 
2004:251). 
  
Second, it is not self-evident that bankruptcy mechanism can enhance distressed local 
governments’ fiscal discipline as a ‘credible threat’, preventing them from going bankrupt in 
advance. This can be clearly illustrated by the experience of US. Although a filing by large 
municipality can ―like the 1994 filing by Orange County, California― involve many 
millions of dollars in municipal debt, chapter 9 cases of general local government are rare. 
This is not to say that sub-national governments in the US never experience fiscal distress. 
New York City, Philadelphia etc. has gone through episodes of threatened if not actual 
insolvency. It must be because actions of state governments create an environment that 
rescues sub-national government from inappropriate policy prior to bankruptcy. Oversight 
and intervention devices vary greatly in the United States. As a general rule, so called “Dillon 
Rule” states in the eastern part of the country have tighter controls over the local governments. 
If the local government gets into trouble, the state is typically in a position to step in and take 
over the operation of the governments (Petersen and Crihfield 2000)9. There is, however, 
                                                  
9  This in illustrated by following episodes. In New York in the mid-1970s, the State of New 
York stepped in at the time of the New York City crises and established a control board that 
effectively dictated city finances. Another example of strong intervention by the state 
occurred in Connecticut with the City of Bridgeport. The City overspent its budget and 
attempted to go into bankruptcy under the federal bankruptcy code. The State subsequently                                            
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another salient tradition of much less oversight in the U.S. which follows from a tradition of 
home-rule whereby the local governments have much more autonomy. The most important 
recent example is that of Orange County California. These episodes make it clear that if the 
local government gets into financial trouble, the state is typically in a position to step in and 
take over the operation of the governments. The states rescue them from financial distress 
prior to bankruptcy. Of course, the local government is a creature of states and bankruptcy 
court has to take care to adjust its authority so as not to interference with the sovereign power 
of the states as guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. On the contrary, the 
central government in Japan can enact both local government and bankruptcy law. 
Implementation of bankruptcy mechanism in Japan may not be more difficult than in federal 
countries (Fitch Ratings 2006). However, it is naive to say that bankruptcy mechanism can 
prevent financially distressed local government from going bankrupt as a ‘credible threat’. It 
may be difficult to let some financially distressed local governments go into bankrupt in 
Japan, where local governments provide core public services with relatively high minimum 
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 Table7.1  Contribution of revenue and expenditure categories in fiscal consolidation 
episodes.   † 
Per cent of GDP 
  Change in expenditure 
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 Note: grants include specific purpose grants and general grants. 
  Source: OECD (1996) National Accounts for OECD Countries, Vol.2, 1982-1994; OECD (2005b) National  
Accounts for OECD Countries, General Governments, vol.4; and OECD(2005c) National Accounts for   














































Note: Repayment costs borne by the central government were calculated by multiplying the outstanding amounts of local 
  bonds and the LAT compensation rate. When the LAT compensation rate varies with local government ‘fiscal strength',   
the lower rate was used, leading to an underestimation of future repayment costs for the central government. 
Source: Mochida, N. (2004) Fiscal Decentralization and State-Local Finance, table6-3. 
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Independent bond       
General public works 
Temporary public works 
General independent public works 
General regional development 
Temporary local road building 
Temporary rive related projects 
Temporary economic package 
Public housing construction 
Compulsory education facilities 
Advanced purchase of land 
Natural disaster recovery 
Tokyo metropolitan development 
General waste disposal 
Depopulated area aid 












































  † 0
2,351
1,693
  †  0
17,467
Special bonds       
Financial support to fill financial gap 
Revenue decrease supplement (82,93, 97)
Temporary special fiscal 
Tax cut supplement 
Temporary tax cut supplement 
























Total outstanding local bonds(excluding 
borrowing from LAT Special Account) 
130,954
 
47,403                                           
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table 7.3 Disclosure of information on financial conditions.




































































Note: total number of designated cities was 14 in FY2004, 13 in FY2003 respectively.
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Note: Spread between sovereign and local bonds, mid price, 10 years of maturity
Source: Nikko City Group Serucities(Corprate bond research bureau: Akane, Enatsu)
 